PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE-BEACH ACCESS-THE PUBLIC'S
RIGHT TO CROSS AND TO USE PRIVATELY OWNED UPPER
BEACH AREAS-Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Association,

95 N.J. 306, 471 A.2d 355, cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 93 (1984).
The New Jersey coastline is undoubtedly one of the most
distinct and valuable natural resources in the Garden State.' A
growing population with an ever higher standard of living and an
increasing amount of leisure time has made this stretch of land
invaluable as a recreational asset. 2 Despite an increasing public
demand for beach access, 3 however, more than one-fourth of
New Jersey's oceanfront property has fallen into the hands of individual landowners who desire the beach for their private use. 4
I See Van Ness v. Borough of Deal, 78 N.J. 174, 178, 393 A.2d 571, 573 (1978).
As the New Jersey Supreme Court has recognized, "New Jersey beaches adjacent to
its tidal areas are world famous because of their suitability for bathing, surf fishing
and other forms of recreation." Id.
2 Note, Access to Public Municipal Beaches: The Formulation of a Comprehensive Legal
Approach, 7 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 936, 936-40 & n.1 (1973).
3 See NEW JERSEY DEPT. OF ENVTL. PROTECTION, STATEWIDE COMPREHENSIVE
OUTDOOR RECREATION PLAN 200 (1977) [hereinafter cited as SCORP]. The New
Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (Department) has concluded that
the projected 1985 peak day demands for salt water swimming will not be met unless there is an expansion of facilities available to the general public. Id. In 1977,
New Jersey could accommodate 2,397,994 persons daily in state owned facilities,
1,414,816 in municipal facilities, and 815,318 in private sector facilities. Id. at 129.
According to the Department, space for an additional 764,812 persons must be
created by 1985, and for over one million by 1995, to meet demands. Id. at 200.
Furthermore, the New Jersey Supreme Court has recognized that " 'with the advent
of automobile traffic and the ever-increasing number of vacationers, the beaches
and bathing facilities [have become] overcrowded.' " Borough of Neptune City v.
Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 61 N.J. 296, 300, 294 A.2d 47, 49 (1972) (quoting
Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 114 N.J. Super. 115, 117,
274 A.2d 860, 861 (Law Div. 1971), rev'd and remanded, 61 NJ. 296, 294 A.2d 47
(1972)).
4 The following table illustrates the ownership of New Jersey's oceanfront
property in 1977:
Owner
Federal
State
County
Municipal
Private
TOTAL

Miles of
Oceanfront Owned
16.6
11.5
0
63.1
32.6
123.8

Percentage of
Total Oceanfront
13.4
9.2
0
51.0
26.3
100.0

NEW JERSEY BEACH ACCESS STUDY COMM'N, PUBLIC ACCESS TO THE OCEANFRONT
BEACHES: A REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND LEGISLATURE OF NEW JERSEY 3, 19

(1977) [hereinafter cited as BEACH ACCESS STUDY].
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The wet sand, 5 or foreshore,6 of the entire New Jersey coast
is said to be held in trust for the public 7 and must be kept available for navigation, commerce, and recreation. a Access to this
tidal area, however, has been restricted by private owners of the
surrounding dry sand areas. 9 Even though some use of the dry
sand area seems necessary in order for the public to enjoy its
5 The wet sand area, also referred to as the foreshore, is generally defined as
the beach area lying between the lines of mean low tide and mean high tide. Borax
Consol. v. Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10, 22-27 (1935).
The diagram below illustrates the position of the wet sand and other significant
divisions of the typical beach:

UPLAND
DUNES OR
DEVELOPMENT

-BEACH

1

DRY-SAND

VEGETATION
LINE
(SEAWALL,
ROAD,
BOARDWALK)

-.
FORESHORE
or

MEAN WT-SAND
HIGH TIDE
LINE
I
I
I

I

AN

MEAN
LOW TIDE
LINE
I

PIERHEAD
LINE

j

TIDELANDS

I
I

SUBMERGED LANDS

AREA OF RIPARIAN GRANTS
(seaward to pierhead line)
PUBLIC TRUST LANDS
(seaward to the 3 nautical mile territorial limit)

supra note 4, at 2.
6 As used in this Note, the term "foreshore" is synonymous with the term wet
sand. Both refer to the area located between mean high tide and mean low tide.
See supra note 5.
7 See infra notes 49-51 & 108-20 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the
origin of the public trust, see Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1 (1821); Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842). See generally Note, The Public Trust in Tidal Areas: A
Sometime Submerged Traditional Doctrine, 79 YALE L.J. 762 (1970).
BEACh ACCESS STUDY,

8 Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 95 N.J. 306, 312, 471 A.2d 355,
358, cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 93 (1984); Lusardi v. Curtis Point Property Owners

Ass'n, 86 N.J. 217, 228, 430 A.2d 881, 886 (1981).
9 The "dry sand" is generally defined as the area above mean high tide and
below the line of vegetation. See supra note 5.
One obvious method of restricting access to the foreshore is for the private
landowner to construct a fence or barrier that prevents the public from crossing the

dry sand area. See, e.g., State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 254 Or. 584, 587-88, 462 P.2d
671, 673 (1969) (enjoining landowners from enclosing dry sand and precluding
public access to foreshore). But cf Spiegle v. Beach Haven, 46 N.J. 479, 218 A.2d
129, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 831 (1966) (upholding municipal ordinance requiring private beachfront property owners to obtain permit before erecting fence from high
water mark landward).
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right to the foreshore, such an incidental right has never been
expressly recognized. Moreover, as public demand increases, the
conflict over the incompatible rights to the upper beach area becomes a more pressing concern.' 0 Thus, the need for a precise
definition of the public's interest has never been more readily
apparent. "
The Borough of Bay Head, New Jersey, is a small, shore
community with approximately one and one-quarter miles of
oceanfront property which is dominated by privately owned
homes.' 2 Except for a small boardwalk, the municipality itself
has no property interest in the dry sand area. 13 The responsibility for controlling and maintaining the beach' 4 resides with a pri10 See, e.g., Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 95 N.J. 306, 471 A.2d 355
(conflict between public and quasi-municipality), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 93 (1984);
Lusardi v. Curtis Point Property Owners Ass'n, 86 N.J. 217, 430 A.2d 881 (1981);
Van Ness v. Borough of Deal, 78 N.J. 174, 393 A.2d 571 (1978) (conflict between
general public and municipality).
II See Van Ness v. Borough of Deal, 78 N.J. 174, 182, 393 A.2d 571, 575 (1978)
(Mountain, J., dissenting). In 1978, Justice Mountain recognized the need for clarification of the public trust doctrine and expressed his reluctance to apply the doctrine until such clarification occurred:
I submit that in New Jersey today there is a continuing and pervasive
uncertainty as to just what the public trust doctrine is and to what
properties it applies. . . . Until the scope of the public trust doctrine is
clarified, it would certainly be the part of wisdom to refrain from incorporating within this doctrine the many miles of valuable beach on the
Atlantic Ocean that are owned by our municipalities.
Id.
12 Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 95 N.J. 306, 313-14, 471 A.2d
355, 359, cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 93 (1984). Located to the north of Bay Head is the
Borough of Point Pleasant; to the south is the Borough of Mantoloking. Id. at 313,
471 A.2d at 359. The Borough of Bay Head has been described as "an affluent
residential community in Ocean County with 1,336 year-round residents." Answering Brief of Certain Defendants at 23, Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n,
No. A-5516-80T3 (N.J. Super. Ct., App. Div. 1982), afd in part, rev'd inpart, 95 N.J.
306, 471 A.2d 355, cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 93 (1984).
'3 See Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 95 N.J. 306, 313-14, 316, 471
A.2d 355, 359-60, cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 93 (1984). The municipally owned boardwalk is approximately one-third of a mile in length. Id. Commercial stores and
vendors are conspicuously absent. Interview with Harry D. McEnroe, seasonal resident of Borough of Mantoloking, NewJersey (Sept. 12, 1984). The boardwalk was
substantially damaged during the winter of 1984. Interview with Alan G. Lesnewich, seasonal resident of Borough of Bay Head, New Jersey (Feb. 21, 1985).
14 The word "beach," as used throughout this Note, is a general term that refers
to the combined dry sand and wet sand areas. See supra note 5. In conformity with
this general usage, a "beach" may be defined as the
gently sloping unvegetated areas of sand or other unconsolidated material that extend landward from the mean high water line to either:
1. The vegetation line;
2. A man-made feature generally parallel to the ocean, inlet, or bay
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vate organization, the Bay Head Improvement Association
(Association).' 5
The primary objective in forming and incorporating the Association was to provide its members 16 with a safe and accessible
beach.17 The Association began to charge an annual fee to its
members and used the funds collected to provide a variety of
services including lifeguards, first aid, beach police, and beach
cleaners. 8 With the exception of a few nonresident municipal
employees, 19 membership was limited to those persons who
owned land or resided in the Borough of Bay Head. 2 The Association owned six shore front properties as well as seven strips of
waters such as a retaining structure, seawall, bulkhead, road or boardwalk, except that sandy areas that extend fully under and landward of an
elevated boardwalk are considered to be beach areas; or
3. The seaward or bayward foot of dunes, whichever is closest to the
bay, inlet or ocean waters.
N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7:7E, § 3.21 (1982).
15 See Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 95 N.J. 306, 314, 471 A.2d
355, 359, cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 93 (1984). The Association was formed in 1910 and
became a nonprofit corporation in 1932. Id.
16 For a discussion of the Association's restrictive membership requirements,
see infra notes 19, 20 & 25-27 and accompanying text.
17 Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 95 NJ. 306, 314, 471 A.2d 355,
359, cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 93 (1984). The Association's certificate of incorporation
stated that its objectives included
the improving and beautifying of the Borough of Bay Head, NewJersey,
cleaning, policing and otherwise making attractive and safe the bathing
beaches in said Borough, and the doing of any act which may be found
necessary or desirable for the greater convenience, comfort and enjoyment of the residents.
Id. (quoting Bay Head Improvement Association Certificate of Incorporation).
18 Id. at 314-15, 471 A.2d at 359. For the summer of 1983, large families (six or
more persons) were charged a $90 membership fee. Smaller families were charged
$60 per year. See id. at 315, 471 A.2d at 359. This annual fee entitled members to
use the Bay Head beach between the hours of 10:00 a.m. and 5:30 p.m. during the
summer months. Id.
19 The Matthews court stated that "[members of the Bay Head Fire Company,
Bay Head Borough employees, and teachers in the municipality's school system
[were] issued beach badges irrespective of residency." Id. at 315, 471 A.2d at 359.
20 Id. At the time of the Matthews decision, there were approximately 4800 to
5000 members in the Bay Head Improvement Association. Id., 471 A.2d at 360.
The restrictive membership rules were consciously designed to benefit the residents of Bay Head. As the Association's constitution made clear, the intent was to
promote the best interests of the Borough of Bay Head and in so doing
to own property, operate bathing beaches, hire life guards, beach cleaners and policemen and to do any and all things which, in the judgment
of their Executive Committee, may be in the best interests of the Borough of Bay Head.
Id. at 329, 471 A.2d at 367 (quoting Bay Head Improvement Association
Constitution).
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Those strips extended

from the end of certain streets through the dry sand to the high
water mark and provided members with a means of access to the
beach.22 In order to offer a large beach to its membership, the
Association leased most of the individually owned beachfront
property in Bay Head during the summer months.23 As a result,
the members enjoyed rights to most of the shoreline within the
Borough of Bay Head.24
Without a badge signifying membership in the Association,
the general public was not permitted to use the Bay Head
beach.25 The restrictive membership rules were designed to limit
beach overcrowding in accordance with the Association's purpose of providing for the "convenience, comfort and enjoyment
of the residents." 2 6 The Association, however, never prevented
nonmembers from enjoying the wet sand if they entered from the
north or the south by walking along the shoreline of neighboring
municipalities.2 7
While the Association's membership restrictions were in effect, Virginia Matthews, a resident of the Borough of Point Pleasant, was denied access to the Bay Head beach when she
attempted to enter through the dry sand.28 She filed suit against
the Association, complaining that its restrictive policy prevented
her from using and enjoying public trust property. 29 The Public
21 Id. at 314, 471 A.2d at 359. Of the six properties owned by the Association,
only three are contiguous. Id. In addition to these six properties, the Bay Head
shoreline is comprised of 70 parcels of land owned by private individuals. See id.at
313-14, 471 A.2d at 359. The Association leased 42 of these individually owned
properties for use during the summer months. Id. at 333, 471 A.2d at 369. These
leases were revocable by either party on 30-day notice. Id. at 314, 471 A.2d at 359.
22 See id.
23 Id.; see supra note 21.
24 See supra note 21.
25 Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 95 N.J. 306, 315, 471 A.2d 355,
359-60, cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 93 (1984). The only exception to the Association's
policy of preventing the general public from crossing the dry sand was that "fishermen [were] permitted to walk through the upper dry sand area to the foreshore."
Id., 471 A.2d at 359. The general public had free access and use of the Association's beach during the off-season, and after 5:30 p.m. until 10:00 a.m. during the
summer months. Id.
26 Id. at 314-15, 471 A.2d at 359-60; see also supra note 17 (quoting Association's
certificate of incorporation).
27 Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 95 N.J. 306, 315, 471 A.2d 355,
360, cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 93 (1984).
28 Id. at 312, 471 A.2d at 358.
29 Id. Initially, suit was filed by the Borough of Point Pleasant against the Bay
Head Improvement Association and the Borough of Bay Head. The Borough of

1985]

NOTES

349

Advocate of New Jersey" joined in the complaint and subsequently became the primary moving party.3 ' Joined in the suit as
named defendants were over one hundred individuals with interests in oceanfront property within the Borough. 32 The Advocate
alleged that the general public had a right of access to swim and
bathe in the public trust lands along the Association's beach. 3
In addition, the complaint asserted that the public had the incidental right to use the private dry sand beaches in order to fully
enjoy its access rights to the lands held in public trust. 34 In Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Association,33 the New Jersey
Supreme Court reversed a divided appellate division panel 3 6 and
held that the public's interest in the tidal lands provides the people with the ancillary right to gain access through and to use the
dry sand area owned by a quasi-public body.3 7
The origin of the public trust doctrine can be traced to ancient Rome . 3 8 As Roman commerce expanded and demand for
access to the seas increased,3 ° the doctrine ofjus publicum40 was
developed, securing for the public certain inalienable rights in
Bay Head was dismissed as a defendant because it had no ownership interest in the
beach area. Id.
30 The Public Advocate of the State of New Jersey at this time was Stanley C.
Van Ness. Id.
31 Id When the Public Advocate intervened, the Borough of Point Pleasant withdrew from the litigation. Id.
32 Id. at 313, 471 A.2d at 358.
33 Id. at 312-13, 471 A.2d at 358.
34 Id.
35 95 N.J. 306, 471 A.2d 355, cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 93 (1984).
36 The appellate division, in an unpublished opinion, affirmed the trial court's
findings that the Association was clearly distinguishable from a public agency and
that the public had no right to the Association's private property. Id. at 316, 471
A.2d at 360. Judge Greenberg, in his dissent, characterized the Bay Head Improvement Association as a "de facto public" organization which must open its beaches.
Id.
37 Id. at 333, 471 A.2d at 369.
38 Id. at 316-17, 471 A.2d at 360. The Matthews court recognized the analogy to
Roman law "which held that '[b]y the law of nature' 'the air, running water, the sea,
and consequently the shores of the sea,' were 'common to mankind.' " Id. (quoting
JUSTINIAN, INSTITUTES 2.1.1 (T. Sandars trans. 1st Am. ed. 1876)); see also Note, State
Citizen Rights Respecting Greatwater Resource Allocation: From Rome to New Jersey, 25
RUTGERS L. REV. 571, 576 (1971).
39 See Note, supra note 7, at 763-64.
40 The termjus publicum refers to "[t]he

right shared by all to navigate on waters
covering foreshore at high tide and, at low tide, to have access across foreshore to
waters for fishing, bathing or any other lawful purpose." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
774 (5th ed. 1979) (citation omitted); see Note, supra note 2, at 941-43; Note, supra
note 38, at 576.
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the foreshore. 4 1 Later, under English law, the public trust doctrine emerged to limit the King's power to transfer tidal property
to private individuals. 42 In the seventeenth century, immediately
preceding the Glorious Revolution, it was generally accepted that
the Crown held tideland property for the common benefit.43 Difficulties arose, however, in relating and applying this principle to
transfers of tidelands located in America.4 4
In 1821, NewJersey's highest court considered the implications of the public trust doctrine in Arnold v. Mundy. 4 5 In Arnold,
the plaintiff staked out an oyster bed located beneath the low
water mark of the Raritan River.46 After the defendant pirated
some of the oysters, the plaintiff brought an action for trespass.4 7
In order for him to prevail in the suit, it was necessary for the
plaintiff to show title in the land beneath the water. 4 ' The Arnold
court affirmed the nonsuit granted below and concluded that
submerged properties "where the tide ebbs and flows . . .are
41 See Note, supra note 7, at 763-64. Use of the seashore was a matter of "juris
gentium," or "the law of the nation," and, regardless of actual possession, every
citizen possessed an inalienable right of access to the sea. Note, supra note 38, at
576.
With the coming of the Dark Ages and the fall of the Roman Empire, commercial and fishing activities became localized. Id. at 575. Ownership was vested in
small communities rather than in the nation as a whole. Id. The struggle for public
rights in the foreshore became extremely difficult, especially with the feudal lords'
expansion of private interests. Id.; see also Note, supra note 7, at 764.
42 See Note, supra note 38, at 577-615 (discussing generally the development of
the doctrine in England). In medieval England, the King had a private interest in
all tidal and riverbed soil. Note, supra note 7, at 764. The passage of the Magna
Carta became the focal point to passing rights in the seashore back to the public.
Id. at 765.
43 See Comment, The Public Trust Doctrine Includes a Right to Equality of Access to
Municipal Beach Area, 4 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 603, 605 (1973); Note, supra note 38, at
592-98; Note, supra note 7, at 768-69. It became commonly understood that there
was a presumption that title was in the Crown for the benefit of the people. Note,
supra note 38, at 591. Eventually the trust held by the King was transferred to Parliament at the end of the Glorious Revolution. Id. at 597.
44 Note, supra note 38, at 613-15. See infra notes 45-73 and accompanying text
for a discussion of cases applying the doctrine in the United States. For a complete
discussion of the development of English law and its application to America, seeJ.
ANGELL, A TREATISE ON THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY IN TIDE WATERS (1847).
After the end of the American Revolution, the states took control of their respective tidal property subject to the Federal government's control of navigation.
Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1894); Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.)
367, 410-11 (1842).
45 6 N.J.L. 1 (1821).
46 Id. at 9, 65.
47 Id. at 9.
48 Id. at 10.
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common to all the people." 4 9 The rights to this tidal area were
said to be vested in the people of New Jersey and even the Legislature could not "make a direct and absolute grant, divesting all
the citizens of their common right."5" Thus, the Arnold court expressly recognized the public trust doctrine as a viable tenet of
the common law. 5 '
Further analysis of the public trust doctrine was undertaken
by the United States Supreme Court in Martin v. Waddell, 2
wherein the Court was called upon to determine the ownership
of land under the Raritan Bay. 53 Beginning with the grant from
Charles II to his brother, the Duke of York, the Martin Court
traced the ownership of the territory that eventually became the
State of New Jersey.5 4 Although the land underlying the Raritan
Bay had been conveyed to private parties, the Court concluded
49 Id. at 12. The court further explained that each person had a right to use the
tidal waters "according to his pleasure, subject only to the laws which regulate that
use; that the property indeed vests in the sovereign, but [only] for the sake of order
and protection, and not for his own use, but for the use of the citizen." Id.
50 Id. at 13. The court characterized the legislature as the representative body of
the people, who solely had the power to dispose of waterfront property. Id. Under
English law, the right to dispose of property within the public domain was vested in
the King alone. Id. at 16.
51 Id. at 13. The Arnold court found support for the adoption of the doctrine by
tracing its history in English law beginning with the reign of Charles II. The King
of England possessed the same power over the American colonies as he did with
respect to other dominions. His rights existed
in granting the soil to private persons, for the purposes of settlement
and colonization, of establishing a government, of supporting a governor, of conveying to him all those things appurtenant to the sovereignty,
commonly called royalties, for the benefit of the colonists, who came
over here clothed with all the essential rights and privileges secured to
the subject by the British constitution; but that he could not, nor never
did, so grant them as to convert them into private property; that those
royalties, therefore, of which those rivers, ports, bays, and coasts were
part, by the grant of king Charles, passed to the duke of York, as the
governor of the province, exercising the royal authority for the public
benefit, and not as the proprietor of the soil, and for his own use; that
they passed from the duke of York to his grantees, and upon the surrender of the government, and as appurtenant thereto, and inseparable
therefrom, reverted to the crown of England.
Id. at 12-13.
52 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842).
53 See id. at 407. Plaintiff wanted to recover some one hundred acres covered
with water, which he claimed title to by charters granted by Charles II to the Duke
of York in 1664 and 1674. Id.
54 Id. at 407-08. Subsequent to the grant to the Duke of York, part of the territory known as East New Jersey was transferred to 24 persons who were known as
the proprietors of East New Jersey. Id. at 407. They controlled this territory with
"all the rights of property and government" previously possessed by the Duke of
York. Id.

352

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 15:344

that the public interest in the tidal areas had never been actually
severed from the land itself.5 5 Thus, as conveyances occurred,
each successive owner acted as a sovereign and took title to land
56
which was "intrusted to his care for the common benefit."
Moreover, the Court stated that "when the [American] Revolution took place, the people of each state became themselves sovereign," and the "absolute right" to all the navigable waters
became vested in the people of each state subject only to the
rights that subsequently were surrendered to the Federal government through the Constitution of the United States.5 7
Although the Martin Court clearly stated that the public trust
had survived and was preserved in the people of each state,5 8 it
failed to delineate the precise limitations on a state legislature's
ability to alienate tidal property. 59 Eight years after Martin, Gough
v. Bell 60 presented the New Jersey Supreme Court with a dispute
concerning those constraints. 6 ' Despite seemingly contrary language in Arnold,6 2 the Gough court concluded that the Legislature
had the power to make an exclusive grant of lands covered by
water to private individuals in complete derogation of the public
Id. at 407, 411.
Id. at 411.
57 Id. at 410. The Martin Court gave great weight to the decision of the New
Jersey Supreme Court in Arnold v. Mundy. Id. at 417. But, independent of Arnold,
the Court held that the State of NewJersey maintained an interest in the tidal lands
within its territory and that these lands must be maintained for public use. See id.
at
418; cf Blundell v. Catteral, 106 Eng. Rep. 1190 (K.B. 1821) (under English law,
limited right of public to use ocean waters for bathing in addition to rights of navigation and fishing).
58 See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
59 See Note, supra note 38, at 620-21. After Martin was decided, the Supreme
Court held, in Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845), that the tidal
waters and the land under those waters belonged to the people of each state. See
Pollard,44 U.S. (3 How.) at 229. Given the public interest established in Mrtin and
Pollard, the question was to what extent the state could abrogate this interest by
transferring tidal property to private ownership.
60 22 N.J.L. 441 (Sup. Ct. 1850), af'd, 23 N.J.L. 624 (1852).
61 Id. at 454. In Gough, the property in question had originally been located
between the low and high water marks. Id. The plaintiff filled in the property so
that it was raised above the high water mark and therefore "above the flow of the
tide." Id. Defendant claimed title to the land through a legislative act. Id. at 455.
62 The court in Arnold stated that
[the] power of disposition and regulation can be exercised only by the
legislative body, who are the representatives of the people for this pur55
56

pose

. . .

but that they cannot make a direct and absolute grant, divest-

ing all the citizens of their common right; such a grant, or a law
authorizing such a grant, would be contrary to the great principles of
our constitution, and never could be borne by a free people.
Arnold, 6 N.J.L. at 13.
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interest. 6 3 Notwithstanding the acknowledged fact that the state
held such lands in trust for the people, the court rationalized that
"[t]he act of the legislature is the act of the people, not that of a
mere trustee holding legal title for the public good." 6 4 In addition, the Gough court held that a riparian proprietor 6 5 could both
exclude the public from, and acquire title to, adjacent tidal lands
down to the low water mark by constructing wharves or making
similar improvements. 6 6
The confusion over a legislature's apparent ability to sterilize the public trust doctrine was diminished by the landmark decision of the United States Supreme Court in Illinois Central
Railroad v. Illinois.6 7 In that case, the railroad claimed that an act
68
of the Illinois Legislature, which was subsequently repealed,
granted to it the exclusive rights to over 1000 acres of submerged land in Chicago harbor. 6 9 The state, however, con63 Gough, 22 N.J.L. at 457. The Gough court framed the issue as whether the
legislature had the right to convey the soil between the low and high water marks so
as to "invest the freehold in an individual." Id. at 456. The court began its analysis
of this issue by noting that the English Parliament clearly had the power to alienate
parts of the public domain. Id. at 457. Although the court recognized that the state
legislature was not as "omnipotent" as Parliament, it reasoned that the "ultimate
dominion" or "absolute power" to dispose of all property must exist somewhere
within the government. Id. This power was said to form the basis of eminent domain. Id. With respect to eminent domain, the Gough court stated that "[i]f the
legislature may dispose of the property of each individual citizen for the public
good, it would seem to be no greater exercise of power to dispose of public property or the common rights of all the people for the same end." Id. The court then
concluded that, although rights to the tidal lands were vested in all the people, "the
legislature, in disposing of [the lands,] act as their representatives, in their name
and in their stead." Id.
64 Gough, 22 N.J.L. at 457-58; see also Note, An Ordinance Providing a ResidencyDifferentiated Fee Schedule for Use of a Municipal Beach Is Invalid as a Violation of the Public
Trust Doctrine, 42 CIN. L. REV. 554, 559 (1973) (remarking that legislature has
"power, absolute and unlimited, to regulate, abridge or vacate public rights in tidal
water except in the field reserved to Congress by the Federal Constitution") (quoting Shultz v. Wilson, 44 N.J. Super. 591, 597, 131 A.2d 415, 418-19 (App. Div.),
certif denied, 24 N.J. 546, 133 A.2d 295 (1957)). But see Note, supra note 38, at 598
(stating that "Parliament is government and representative, not proprietor; it holds
its power by popular assent").
65 As used in this context, a "riparian proprietor" can be defined as "the owner
of the land adjoining the shore of tide waters above the ordinary flow of the tides."
Gough, 22 N.J.L. at 464.
66 Id. at 464, 470. Compare Arnold, in which the court stated that ownership of
land located on a navigable river extends only to the edge of the water, but the area
"between the high water and low water mark, may be exclusively appropriated by
the owner of the adjacent land, by building thereon docks, wharves, storehouses,
salt-pans, or other structures which exclude the reflow of the water." Id.
67 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
68 See id. at 449.
69 Id. at 450, 454. The act established the railroad's right to construct wharves,
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tended that it held the exclusive rights to the bed of Lake
Michigan and sought a decree to enjoin the railroad from constructing docks, piers, wharves, and similar structures; to force
the railroad to remove existing structures; and to affirm the
state's exclusive right to make such improvements along the
shoreline.70
The Illinois Central Railroad Court revitalized the public trust
doctrine and reaffirmed the inherent limitations on a legislature's
ability to alienate submerged property. 7 ' The Court made clear
that a state's title to land beneath navigable waters is "held in
trust for the people of the State" and that "[t]he State can no
more abdicate its trust over property in which the whole people
are interested, ...

than it can abdicate its police powers in the

administration of government and the preservation of the
peace."' 72 Moreover, the only grants of public trust lands that
were held to be legitimate were those that improved the public's
ability to use the waters, or those that did not "substantially impair the public interest in the lands and waters remaining. 73
In modern times, there has been a high demand in the
United States for oceanfront property.74 In light of such demand, the significant question of whether the public trust doctrine protects a common right to use the tidelands for
recreational purposes has been answered affirmatively in several
jurisdictions. 75 The New Jersey Supreme Court, in Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 76 was faced with an ordinance which required nonresidents who desired to use the beach
to pay a substantially higher fee than that charged to residents. 77
The entire foreshore of the Avon beach was owned in fee by the
piers, docks, and other works in the harbor. Id. at 451. The act also transferred
"all the right and title of the state" to the railroad. Id. at 450.
70 Id. at 452.
71 Id. at 453. The Illinois Central Railroad Court stated that a grant by the state of
land under navigable water "would be held, if not absolutely void on its face, as
subject to revocation." Id.
72 Id. at 452-53.
73 Id. at 452. The Court noted that certain grants such as those to establish
wharves and piers are a valid exercise of legislative power consistent with the public
trust. Id.
74 See supra notes 2 & 3 and accompanying text.
75 See, e.g., Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 2 Cal. 3d 29, 465 P.2d 50, 84 Cal. Rptr.
162 (1970); Gewirtz v. City of Long Beach, 69 Misc. 2d 763, 330 N.Y.S.2d 495
(Sup. Ct. 1972); State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 254 Or. 584, 462 P.2d 671 (1969).
76 61 N.J. 296, 294 A.2d 47 (1972).
77 Id. at 302, 294 A.2d at 50-51. Originally, Avon's ordinance did not distinguish between residents and nonresidents. The discriminatory fee scheme was enacted in 1970 as an amendment to the original statute. Id.
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state, whereas title to the dry sand was held by the municipality.78
The issue before the court was whether the municipality could
restrict access to the ocean through fee discrimination. 79 A modern and dynamic view of the public trust doctrine was set forth,
with the court stating that the doctrine was not "fixed or static,"
but rather was a flexible concept which clearly extended "to recreational uses, including bathing, swimming and other shore activities." 8 The court concluded that "the beach . . . must be
open to all on equal terms and without preference and that any
contrary state or municipal action is impermissible.'
The Avon decision focused primarily upon that aspect of the
82
public trust doctrine which provides for access to the foreshore.
Although the doctrine's effect on the Legislature's ability to
alienate trust lands was not directly at issue,8" the court felt compelled to comment on the New Jersey case law which had addressed that point. 84 Contrary to the United States Supreme
Court's view in Illinois Central Railroad,8 5 a substantial number of

New Jersey decisions had suggested that the Legislature possessed an absolute power to dispose of tidal property. 6 The
78 Id. at 299-300, 294 A.2d at 49. The state's ownership of the wet sand and
submerged lands seaward of the high water mark was established in Bailey v. Driscoil, 19 N.J. 363, 367-68, 117 A.2d 265, 267-68 (1955).
79 Avon, 61 N.J. at 298, 294 A.2d at 48. The actual authority allowing municipalities to charge beach fees is conferred by statute. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:61-2.20
(West 1967). The statute does not, however, address the issue of whether nonresidents may be charged a higher fee than residents. Id.
80 Avon, 61 N.J. at 309, 294 A.2d at 54. The court stated that the public trust
doctrine was designed to be "molded and extended to meet changing conditions
and needs of the public it was created to benefit." Id.
81 Id.
82 See id. at 306-07, 294 A.2d at 53. There are essentially two aspects to the
public trust doctrine. Id. at 306, 294 A.2d at 53. The first aspect concerns the
limitation on the legislature's ability to alienate trust lands. Id. The second aspect
relates to public access to the beach. Id. at 306-07, 294 A.2d at 53. The Avon court
dealt with the first aspect only in a tangential way. Id.
83 See id.; supra note 82.
84 See Avon, 61 N.J. at 307-08, 294 A.2d at 53-54.
85 See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Court's
view.
86 See, e.g., Stevens v. Paterson and Newark R.R., 34 N.J.L. 532, 549-50 (1870)
(stating that, absent Federal protection, "public rights in navigable rivers can, to
any extent, be modified or absolutely destroyed by statute"); Schultz v. Wilson, 44
N.J. Super. 591, 594 (App. Div.) (legislature has unlimited power "to regulate,
abridge or vacate public rights in tidal waters"), certif. denied, 24 N.J. 546 (1957);
Ross v. Mayor and Council, 115 N.J.L. 477, 484, 180 A. 866, 870 (Sup. Ct. 1935)
(holding legislature, like Parliament, has "omnipotent authority" to abrogate public rights in tidal lands), aff'dper curiam, 116 N.J.L. 447, 184 A. 810, cert. denied, 299
U.S. 543 (1936).
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Avon court explained that such a proposition was most likely "too
broad."87
The dissent in Avon excepted to the majority's implication
that the public trust doctrine "carrie[d] with it . . .the right to
use and enjoy any beach upland for purposes of recreation and
access to the ocean."8 8 In the dissent's opinion, the Borough of
Avon could have lawfully fenced-in all of its dry sand property,
thereby excluding all nonresidents from the beach. 8 9
The hypothetical issue posited by the dissent in Avonwhether a municipality could exclude all nonresidents from a municipally owned beach 9 0 -materialized several years later. In Van
Ness v. Borough of Deal,9 the Borough of Deal had built and maintained a beach club, the Deal Casino, which could only be used
by residents of the municipality.9 2 The borough also owned two
other beaches, which were open to the general public. 9 3 The restrictions at the Deal Casino began fifty feet inland from the high
water mark.9 4 At that point, the beach was roped off, and the
public was prevented from using the club's facilities and the remainder of the dry beach. 9 5 There was no prohibition, however,
against public use of the ocean or the wet sand in front of the
Casino.9 6
The Public Advocate sought to force the borough both to
cease its discrimination against nonresidents and to open the entire beach in front of the Casino to the public. 97 The appellate
Avon, 61 N.J. at 308, 294 A.2d at 54.
Id. at 312, 294 A.2d at 56 (Francis, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
Id. at 313, 294 A.2d at 57 (Francis, J., dissenting). But see State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 254 Or. 584, 587-88, 462 P.2d 671, 673 (1969) (affirming trial court's
order removing fences from dry sand areas).
90 Avon, 61 N.J. at 313, 294 A.2d at 57.
91 78 N.J. 174, 393 A.2d 571 (1978).
92 Id. at 176, 393 A.2d at 572. The Deal Casino was constructed in 1956 at a
cost of approximately $800,000. Id. The 420 foot beach in front of the Casino was
created by bulldozing a high bluff, which was previously unsuitable for bathing. Id.
The Casino's facilities included two swimming pools, a snack bar, rest rooms, bathhouses, and areas for ping-pong, basketball, and shuffleboard. Id.
93 Id. at 175-77, 393 A.2d at 571-72. Of the three beaches owned by the municipality, the beaches north and south of the Casino were open to the public. Id. The
northern beach stretched some 435 feet along the ocean and had bathhouses and
rest rooms. Id. at 176, 393 A.2d at 571. This beach was available on a daily and
seasonal basis to residents and nonresidents alike. Id., 393 A.2d at 572. To the
south of the Casino was a municipally owned surfing and boating beach; it was also
available to members of the general public. Id. at 177, 393 A.2d at 572.
94 Id. at 176, 393 A.2d at 572.
87
88
89

95 Id.
96 Id.

97 Id. at 177, 393 A.2d at 572. In addition to opening the beach, the Public
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division observed that, unlike the Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea,
the Borough of Deal had not "dedicated ' 9 8 the Casino's beach to
public use.9 9 It thus opined that Avon was distinguishable and
accordingly reversed the judgment against Deal rendered by the
trial court.' 00 The supreme court disagreed, holding that Deal's
failure to dedicate the beach to public use was "immaterial."' 01
The Casino's beach, the court concluded, was subject to the public trust doctrine and therefore the public had "the right to use
and enjoy it."' 1 2

Although the principles espoused in Avon and Deal clearly
recognized a public interest in the dry sand or upper beach
area, 0 3 those decisions specifically dealt with land owned by a
municipality.'0 4 In Matthews the New Jersey Supreme Court analyzed the relationship between the public trust doctrine and privately owned dry sand areas.' 5 After tracing the development of
the public trust doctrine in New Jersey, 1" 6 the Matthews court
stated that the public's interest in privately owned dry sand may
give rise to two kinds of rights: first, the "right to cross privatelyowned dry sand beaches in order to gain access to the foreshore"; and, second, "the right to sunbathe and generally [to]
enjoy [the dry sand for] recreational activities." ' 107
Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Schreiber reiterated
the "unique" nature of the New Jersey shoreline and substantiAdvocate originally sought to open the Casino's facilities by force of the public
trust doctrine. Id. This contention was withdrawn by the Public Advocate during
oral argument before the supreme court. Id. at 178, 393 A.2d at 573.
98 For authorities dealing with the concept of "dedication," see infra note 156.
99 Van Ness v. Borough of Deal, 145 N.J. Super. 369, 379-80, 367 A.2d 1191,
1197 (App. Div. 1976), rev'd, 78 N.J. 174, 393 A.2d 571 (1978).
100 See id. The appellate division also held that the Casino's residency-based
membership policy was a reasonable classification which did not violate either the
state or the Federal equal protection clause. Id. at 378, 367 A.2d at 1197-98.
101 Id. at 179, 393 A.2d at 573. The court noted that, although the Casino's
beach was not dedicated to the general public, it was dedicated to recreational activities. Id. It was held that Deal could not "frustrate the public right by limiting its
dedication of use to residents of Deal. Nor [could] it allocate to the public on a
limited basis, rights which, under the doctrine, the public inherently ha[d] in full."
Id. at 180, 393 A.2d at 574.
102 Id.
103 See Avon, 61 N.J. at 309, 294 A.2d at 54; Deal, 78 N.J. at 179-80, 393 A.2d at
573-74.
104 See supra notes 78, 90-93 and accompanying text.
105 Matthews, 95 N.J. at 322-26, 471 A.2d at 363-66.
106 See id. at 316-22, 471 A.2d at 360-63; supra notes 45-66, 76-102 and accompanying text.
107 Matthews, 95 N.J. at 322-23, 471 A.2d at 363-64.
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ated the growing public need for open beaches.10 ' Relying on a
variety of authorities, the court emphasized that the projected
demand for ocean swimming could not be met unless existing
beach areas were expanded.' 0 9 Justice Schreiber began his analysis of the access question by noting that the opportunity to swim
and bathe may be entirely dependent upon the public's ability to
reach the foreshore." ° Absent the right to gain access to the
foreshore, he observed, the public's right to use the beach would
be effectively eliminated."' At the same time, however, the court
indicated that the public's right to cross over the dry sand was
not absolute or unrestricted. 12 The public simply required "reasonable access to the sea."' '" The test, the court concluded, was
whether the existing means of entry to the beachfront were "reasonably satisfactory."'14
After determining that the public has a right of reasonable
access to the sea, the Matthews court proceeded to address the
issue of whether the public has the right to use and enjoy privately owned dry sand. 15 The court immediately recognized that
one cannot truly enjoy the ocean without taking brief periods for
rest and relaxation on the dry sand. 1 6 Absent the ability to use
the upper beach area for recreation, enjoyment of the foreshore
for swimming and bathing would be greatly curtailed." 17 That
fact, the court stated, furnished the basis for the holdings in Avon
108 Id. at 323, 471 A.2d at 364; see also supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text
(relating to overall demand for New Jersey beaches).
109 Matthews, 95 N.J. at 323, 471 A.2d at 364 (citing SCORP, supra note 3, at 200)
(quoting Lusardi v. Curtis Point Property Owners Ass'n, 86 N.J. 217, 227-28, 430
A.2d 881, 886 (1981)). In Lusardi, Justice Pashman noted that New Jersey's
-[o]cean front property is uniquely suitable for bathing and other recreational activities. Because it is unique and highly in demand, there is growing concern about
the reduced 'availability to the public of its priceless beach areas.' " Lusardi, 86 N.J.
at 227, 430 A.2d at 886 (quoting Deal, 78 N.J. at 180, 393 A.2d at 574).
1o Matthews, 95 N.J. at 323, 471 A.2d at 364.

I1 Id.
112

Id. at 324, 471 A.2d at 364.

113 Id.

114 Id. at 325, 471 A.2d at 365. In order to formulate this test, Justice Schreiber
relied on Judge Best's dissent in Blundell v. Catterall, 106 Eng. Rep. 1190, 1193
(K.B. 1821). In Blundell, Judge Best found that access to the foreshore was an essential component of one's right to use the ocean. Blundell, 106 Eng. Rep. at 1193.
Judge Best stated that he "would hold on principles of public policy, [or] . ..public necessity, that the interruption of free access to the sea is a public nuisance." Id.
at 1197.
''5
Matthews, 95 N.J. at 325, 471 A.2d at 365.
116

Id.

117 Id.
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and Deal." 8 Moreover, the Matthews court found that the rights
flowing from the public trust doctrine are not limited to municipally owned property." 9 Accordingly, it was held that the public
does indeed have a right to use private dry sand areas when such
use is "essential
or reasonably necessary for enjoyment of the
120
ocean."'
The Matthews court did, however, give credence to the view
12
that a private land owner is not equivalent to a municipality.
Consequently, it stated that "the public's rights in private
beaches are not co-extensive with the rights enjoyed in municipal
beaches."' 22 Nevertheless, the court suggested that there are circumstances under which the public's right to the foreshore will
be paramount. 1 23 The determination as to which particular parcels of private beach will be subjected to that paramount right
24
was said to depend upon the circumstances of each case.'
After determining the public trust doctrine's applicability to
privately owned dry sand, the court proceeded to apply its conclusions to the facts surrounding the Bay Head Improvement Association. 1 25 The court's analysis necessarily turned on whether
the Association, as a private organization, could prohibit public
use of the dry sand area by restricting its membership to Bay
Head residents. 126 The court thus felt compelled to examine
specifically the power of the judiciary to review membership limi12 7
tations imposed by private associations.
Turning to this collateral issue, the Matthews court avowed
the general rule that courts will not require admission to a voluntary association.' 28 It noted, however, that an exception exists
'I8

Id.

Id.
Id.; cf. State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 254 Or. 584, 600, 462 P.2d 671, 678-79
(1969) (Denecke, J., concurring) (basing public right to dry sand on existence of
four factors).
121 See Matthews, 95 N.J. at 326, 471 A.2d at 365.
'19
120

122

Id.

123

Id.

124 Id. To aid in this determination, the court suggested that the following factors

be considered: "[l]ocation of the dry sand area in relation to the foreshore, extent
and availability of publicly-owned upland sand area, nature and extent of the public
demand, and usage of the upland sand land by the owner." Id.
125 See id. at 326-27, 471 A.2d at 366. The court began this analysis by focusing
on "whether the dry sand area that the Association owns or leases should be open
to the public to satisfy the public's rights under the public trust doctrine." Id. at
327, 471 A.2d at 366.
127

Id.
Id.

128

Id. (citing Rutledge v. Gulian, 93 N.J. 113, 118, 459 A.2d 680, 682-83 (1983);

126
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for quasi-public organizations. 129 Because quasi-public organizations have an obligation to further the general welfare, Justice
Schreiber observed, courts will be more apt to scrutinize their
3
membership policies. 1
Following the establishment of this underlying precept, the
court discussed two illustrative cases, both of which concerned
admission to medical associations.1 3 1 The first case involved a
doctor who was excluded from a hospital's courtesy staff; 1 32 the
33
second involved exclusion from a county medical association.
In both instances, the courts intervened, compelling admission to
the organizations. 34 From these cases, the Matthews court derived the principle that the judiciary has broad authority to suHiggins v. American Soc'y of Clinical Pathologists, 51 N.J. 191, 199, 238 A.2d 665,
669 (1968)).
129 See id.
130 See id. (citing Guerrero v. Burlington County Memorial Hosp., 70 N.J. 344,
357-58, 360 A.2d 334, 341 (1976)). The Guerrero court held that judicial review of
an administrative decision to deny a doctor staff rights in the defendant hospital

should "focus . . . its atiention . . . on the reasonableness of the action 'as it relates to . . . [his] service to the public.' " Guerrero, 70 N.J. at 357-58, 360 A.2d at

341 (quoting Davis v. Morristown Memorial Hosp., 106 N.J. Super. 33, 43, 254
A.2d 125, 131 (Ch. Div. 1969)).
131 See Matthews, 95 N.J. at 327-28, 471 A.2d at 366-67.
132 Id. In Greisman v. Newcomb Hosp., 40 N.J. 389, 192 A.2d 817 (1963), an
osteopath and another doctor sought admission to the defendant hospital. Greisman, 40 N.J. at 391-93, 192 A.2d at 818-19. The hospital refused to admit the
plaintiff and argued that its actions were not subject to judicial review. Id. at 39295, 192 A.2d at 819-20. The court held that the hospital was not "private" in the
true sense of the word. Id. at 396, 192 A.2d at 821. The hospital, the court observed, was a nonprofit organization dedicated to the public concern of serving the
sick and injured; its funds were largely obtained from public sources and from public donations. Id. In addition, the court noted, the hospital's tax benefits were received because of its "non-private aspects." Id. The Greisman majority concluded
that "courts would indeed be remiss if they declined to intervene where . . . the
[hospital's] powers were invoked . . . to preclude . . . staff membership, not be-

cause of any lack of individual merit, but for a reason unrelated to sound hospital
standards and not in furtherance of the common good." Id. at 404, 192 A.2d at
825.
133 Matthews, 95 N.J. at 328, 471 A.2d at 367. In Falcone v. Middlesex County
Medical Soc'y, 34 N.J. 582, 170 A.2d 791 (1961), the exclusion of the doctor from
the medical society caused him to be dropped from the medical staff of two area
hospitals and effectively precluded him from continuing his practice. Falcone, 34
N.J. at 587, 170 A.2d at 794. The court stated that although the judiciary has been
"reluctant to interfere with the internal affairs of membership associations," under
certain circumstances, in which "considerations of policy and justice [are] sufficiently compelling, judicial scrutiny" will not be denied. Id. at 590, 170 A.2d at
796.
134 Greisman v. Newcomb Hosp., 40 N.J. 389, 402-04, 192 A.2d 817, 824-25
(1963); Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical Soc'y, 34 N.J. 582, 598, 170 A.2d
791, 800 (1961).
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pervise the exclusionary membership policies of a nonprofit
association which is "authorized and endeavors to carry out a
purpose serving the general welfare."' 135 When dealing with this
type of organization, Justice Schreiber observed, courts may review a denial of membership in order to ensure 1that
the decision
36
was made in furtherance of the common good.
The court thus was obliged to entertain the question of
whether the Bay Head Improvement Association could properly
be characterized as quasi-public. 137 Justice Schreiber noted several factors, which indicated that the Association was a nonprofit
organization, acting to " 'promote the best interests of the Borough of Bay Head.' "138 First, the Association worked in close
cooperation with the town council and accepted property tax
benefits, free office space in the Borough Hall, and government
funds for beach improvements. 139 In addition, the undertaking
to provide lifeguards, beach cleaners, and beach patrols was
identical to a municipality's method of beach management.140
The court's final conclusion was that the Association's quasi-public status was "apparent." 141
Having determined that the Association was a quasi-public
organization, the Matthews court next reviewed the Association's
exclusion of nonresidents and found that such discrimination
conflicted with "the strong public policy 'in favor of encouraging
135 Matthews, 95 N.J. at 328, 471 A.2d at 367. Specifically, the court held that
"[wlhen a nonprofit association rejects a membership application for reasons unrelated to its purposes and contrary to the general welfare, courts have 'broad judicial
authority to insure that exclusionary policies are lawful and are not applied arbitrarily or discriminately.' " Id. at 329, 471 A.2d at 367 (quoting Greisman v. Newcomb Hosp., 40 N.J. 389, 395, 192 A.2d 817, 820 (1963)).
136 Matthews, 95 N.J. at 328, 471 A.2d at 367.
137 See id. at 329, 471 A.2d at 367.
138 Id. (quoting Bay Head Improvement Association Constitution). For a description of the Association's certificate of incorporation and constitutional objectives, respectively, see supra notes 17 & 20.
139 Matthews, 95 N.J. at 329-30, 471 A.2d at 367-68. After the Bay Head Borough
Council passed resolutions approving the Association's plan to control and maintain the town's beaches, the municipality cooperated by providing "office space
without charge in the Borough Hall between 1934 and 1973." Id. at 329, 471 A.2d
at 367. Until 1975, the seven oceanfront parcels owned by the Association were
not assessed property tax. Id. at 329-30, 471 A.2d at 367. In addition, "[t]he Borough's blanket liability insurance policies in effect between 1962 and 1968 covered
the Association's activities." Id. at 330, 471 A.2d at 367. Furthermore, public
funds were used for the Association's benefit. Id., 471 A.2d at 367-68.
140 Id. at 330, 471 A.2d at 368.
141 Id.
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and expanding public access to and use of shoreline areas.' ,142
Because the Association was clearly frustrating rights protected
by the public trust doctrine, the court43 held that membership
must be opened to the general public.'
The remainder of the court's opinion established the exact
mandate by which the Association must abide in opening its
membership. 14 4 The precise number of daily and seasonal beach
badges to be made available to nonresidents was left to the discretion of the local authorities. 145 Moreover, the Association's
as the fees charged
right to collect beach fees was upheld so long
146
nonresidents.
against
do not discriminate
Aware of the broad, sweeping nature of its opinion, the Matthews court declared that it was not determining whether all privately owned upland dry sand would also have to be opened to
the public. 4 7 With the opening of the Association's beach, the
court observed, the public's interest would be reasonably satisfied at the present time.' 4 8 The court, however, admonished the
private landowners who leased upper beach property to the Association that if their leases were cancelled in an effort to circumvent the court's directive, future litigation might fix the public's
rights as being superior to the private property interests of those
individuals.

149

142 Id. at 331-32, 471 A.2d at 368 (quoting Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 2 Cal. 3d
29, 43, 465 P.2d 50, 59, 84 Cal. Rptr. 162, 171 (1970)).
143 Id. at 332, 471 A.2d at 368.
144 Id., 471 A.2d at 369. Although the court noted that opening the Association's
membership may in fact give the public broader rights than actually required by the
public trust, it stated that "opening the Association's membership to all ... should
lead to a substantial satisfaction of the public trust doctrine." Id.
145 Id. The court did, however, advise the Association to consider "all relevant
matters" in making such a determination, including "the public demand and the
number of bathers and swimmers that may be safely and reasonably accommodated
on the Association's property, whether owned or leased." Id.
146 Id. These fees may be assessed to cover the "cost of lifeguards, beach cleaners, patrols, equipment, insurance, and administrative expenses." Id.

147 Id. at 333, 471 A.2d at 369.
148

Id. The court did note that
[i]t [was] not necessary. . . to determine under what circumstances and
to what extent there will be a need to use the dry sand of private owners
who either now or in the future may have no leases with the Association.
Resolution of the competing interests .

.

.

would depend upon the spe-

cific facts in controversy.
Id.

149 Id. Specifically, the court's admonishment took form in the following
language:
If any of these leases have been or are to be terminated, or if the Association were to sell all or part of its property, it may necessitate further
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In a final note, the court acknowledged that its decision
would create "considerable uncertainty," 15 and that disagreement as to the application of the principles it enunciated unWith that in mind, the court stated
doubtedly would occur.'
that future disputes between the public and private landowners
should be resolved in52favor of the private owner "until the contrary is established."1

While most jurisdictions generally agree that the public has
an interest in the foreshore, there has been little conformity concerning the legal basis for creating that right. 153 Although New
Jersey has held steadfast to one legal theory-the public trust
doctrine ' 54 -otherjurisdictions have relied upon theories of prescription,

55

dedication, 1 56 or custom 1 57 as a basis for ensuring

the public's right of access to the ocean.

58

The Matthews deci-

adjudication of the public's claims in favor of the public trust on part or
all of these or other privately-owned upland dry sand lands depending
upon the circumstances.
Id.

Id. at 334, 471 A.2d at 370.
151 See id.
150
152

Id.

See infra notes 154-58 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 45-66, 76-102 and accompanying text.
155 See, e.g., City of Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc., 294 So. 2d 73, 75 (Fla.
1974) (recognizing prescriptive easement for recreational purposes may exist,
although not under facts of particular case); Moody v. White, 593 S.W.2d 372, 377
(Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (equating requirements of prescriptive easement with those
of adverse possession); Seaway Co. v. Attorney Gen., 375 S.W.2d 923, 937-39 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1964) (holding public's "daily systematic use" of beach without permission or objection by owners gave rise to prescriptive easement). See generally D.
DUcSIK, SHORELINE FOR THE PUBLIC 106-10 (1974); Degnan, Public Rights inOcean
Beaches: A Theory of Prescription, 24 SYRACUSE L. REV. 935 (1973).
156 See, e.g., Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 2 Cal. 3d 29, 465 P.2d 50, 84 Cal. Rptr.
162 (1970) (elucidating elements of common law dedication and holding implied
dedication to public occurred in two consolidated cases); Lines v. State, 245 Ga.
390, 392-97, 264 S.E.2d 891, 895-97 (1980) (holding mere use of property by public not exclusive control and not sufficient to create implied dedication); Seaway Co.
v. Attorney Gen., 375 S.W.2d 923, 935-37 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964) (explaining sufficiency of evidence required to establish implied dedication and holding dedication
to exist). See generally D. DUCSIK, supra note 155, at 112-18.
157 See, e.g., State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 254 Or. 584, 595-99, 462 P.2d 671, 67678 (1969) (basing public rights on doctrine of custom and enjoining landowners
from constructing fences in dry sand). But see Gillies v. Orienta Beach Club, 159
Misc. 675, 681-82, 289 N.Y.S. 733, 740 (Sup. Ct. 1935) (refusing to adopt the English doctrine of custom). See generally Comment, Customary Public Use of Privately
Owned Beach Precludes Activity of Owner Inconsistent with Public Interest, 2 FLA. ST. U.L.
REV. 806 (1974).
158 Although New Jersey primarily relies upon the public trust doctrine to protect
the public's right to the beach, some cases have analyzed other theories. See, e.g.,
Beach Realty Co. v. City of Wildwood, 105 N.J.L. 317, 144 A. 720 (1928) (rejecting
153
154
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sion was rendered at a time when the public trust doctrine was
159
already deeply ingrained in the common law of New Jersey.
Since its inception, the essential purpose of the doctrine has been
to assure that natural water resources are continuously available0
to the public for navigation, fishing, and commercial activities.16

Presently, the public trust doctrine serves as the legal basis
for satisfying an ever-increasing demand for access to beach
property. 161 The contemporary purpose for establishing the public's right in such property is to ensure that62the foreshore will
always exist as a place for public recreation.
In Avon and Deal, the public trust doctrine served as the basis
for precluding municipalities from discriminating against persons who did not reside within those particular shore communities. 163 But those opinions were limited in scope and avoided the
difficult question of the doctrine's application to privately owned
beaches. Permeating the reasoning in those decisions, however,
was the notion that projected demand created the justification for
expanding public rights.' 64 Given the underlying rationale of increased demand, the Matthews decision represents a logical and
inevitable extension of Avon and Deal. In applying the public
trust doctrine to a quasi-public body that controlled beach property, New Jersey's high court simply reacted to 1the
public need by
65
increasing the supply of available beachfront.
The decision in Matthews represents the first time that a New
defendant's claim of dedication); Spiegle v. Borough of Beach Haven, 116 N.J.
Super. 148, 157-61, 281 A.2d 377, 382-84 (App. Div. 1971) (applying legal theory
of prescriptive easement to beachfront property); Murphy v. Borough of Point
Pleasant, 123 N.J.L. 88, 8 A.2d 116 (Sup. Ct. 1939) (affirming jury's finding of no
dedication).
159 See supra notes 45-102 and accompanying text.
160 Illinois Central Railroad, 146 U.S. at 452; Arnold, 6 N.J.L. at 12.
161 See Matthews, 95 N.J. at 326, 471 A.2d at 365; see also Note, supra note 7, at 77273 & Fig. 1.
162 See Matthews, 95 N.J. at 321, 471 A.2d at 363; Avon, 61 N.J. at 309-10, 294
A.2d at 54-55; see also Comment, Assault on the Beaches: "Taking" Public Recreational
Rights to Private Property, 60 B.U.L. REV. 933, 933 (1980).
163 See supra notes 76-102 and accompanying text.
164 For example, the court in Deal recognized that New Jersey "is rapidly approaching a crisis as to the availability to the public of its priceless beach areas" and
that "[t]he situation will not be helped by restrained judicial pronouncements."
Deal, 78 N.J. at 180, 393 A.2d at 574. Furthermore, "[p]rompt and decisive action
by the Court is needed." Id.; see also, e.g., Avon, 61 N.J. at 307, 294 A.2d at 53 (noting that "tidal water resources ... are becoming very scarce, demands upon them
by reason of. . . their popularity for recreational uses . . . are much heavier, and
their importance to the public welfare has become much more apparent").
165 See Matthews, 95 NJ. at 326, 471 A.2d at 365.
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Jersey court actually attempted to define the public's interest in
the dry sand area. Although attempts had been made to establish
the public's right to privately owned beaches under the legal theory of implied dedication, 166 prior to Avon there was no clear suggestion in New Jersey law that the public trust doctrine was
applicable to any land above the mean high water mark. The
Matthews court reaffirmed the public's right, which was asserted
in Avon, by extending67it to property controlled by an entity other
than a municipality. 1

The Matthews court held that the public's right to have reasonable access to the ocean required a quasi-public body to open
its beach to the general public. 6 " In so holding, the court espoused the principle that the public possesses the right to use
privately owned dry sand whenever such use is reasonably necessary.' 69 A question that arises in analyzing the future impact of
the Matthews decision concerns the degree of significance that
should be attached to the quasi-public determination. 7 0
Despite the court's finding that the Bay Head Improvement
Association was the functional equivalent of a municipality,' 7 ' the
fact remains that the vast majority of the Bay Head beach was
privately owned by individuals who leased parcels to the Association. "72
' Thus, although ostensibly dealing with quasi-public
beach property, the Matthews decision impacted directly on privately owned land.
The principal reason for the court's quasi-public determination was to justify its review of the Association's membership requirements. 73 It was not, however, necessary for the court to
compel the admission of nonresidents to the Association. The
mandates of the public trust doctrine could have been met by
simply ordering the Association to admit nonmembers to the
beach. Thus, it can reasonably be concluded that the quasi-public nature of the defendant Association was not a determinative
factor in the court's holding. In future litigation involving private organizations, Matthews should not be distinguished on the
166
167
168
169
170

174.

See supra note 158.
See supra notes 115-20 and accompanying text.
Matthews, 95 N.J. at 332, 471 A.2d at 368.
Id. at 326, 471 A.2d 365.
The answer to this question can be found in the text accompanying infra note

See Matthews, 95 N.J. at 330, 471 A.2d at 368.
See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
Matthews, 95 N.J. at 327, 471 A.2d at 366; see supra notes 126 & 127 and accompanying text.
171

172
173
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ground that it involved a quasi-public entity. 174
Although ambiguity potentially may arise from the quasipublic status of the Bay Head Improvement Association, a thorough prospective analysis of the Matthews decision cannot ignore
the court's clear statements regarding public rights in privately
owned dry sand beaches. 75 For the first time, it was made clear
that "private land is not immune from a possible right of access
to the foreshore .

. . ,

nor is it immune from the possibility that

some of the dry sand may be used by the public.' 1 76 The court
held that the public may cross private dry sand if alternative
means of reaching the ocean are not "reasonably satisfactory." 177
In addition, it is now clear that the public may use privately
owned upper beach areas for rest and relaxation if such use is
"reasonably necessary" in order to enjoy the foreshore. 78
When the Matthews court's expansion of public beach rights
is juxtaposed with its conservative command that all irresolvable
disputes between the public and individual landowners be decided in favor of the private owner, an internal inconsistency in
the court's opinion becomes apparent.' 79 The tension between
public and private interests in upper beach areas is exacerbated,
on the one hand, by the suggestion that although the public possesses rights of reasonable access and use, those rights are subject to a judicial presumption in favor of the private
landowner.'
On the other hand, the court stated that "private
landowners may not in all instances prevent the public from exercising its rights under the public trust doctrine."' 8'' The court's
antithetical propositions create a legal
conundrum, which can
8 2
only be clarified by further litigation.
174 The essence of the court's reasoning in Matthews was not dependent upon the
status of the littoral landowner. Rather, the underlying impetus for providing the
public with "reasonable" rights grew solely out of the public need. See supra notes
164 & 165 and accompanying text.
175 See infra notes 176-78 and accompanying text.
176 Matthews, 95 NJ. at 333-34, 471 A.2d at 369.
177 Id. at 325, 471 A.2d at 365.
178 Id. The court stated, however, that this use was "subject to an accommodation
of the interests of the [property] owner." Id. (footnote omitted).
179 Compare supra notes 176-78 and accompanying text with Matthews, 95 N.J. at
334, 471 A.2d at 370 (stating "[w]here the parties are unable to agree as to the
application of the principles enunciated herein, the claim of the private owner shall
be honored until the contrary is established").
180 See supra note 179.
181 Matthews, 95 N.J. at 326, 471 A.2d at 365-66.
182 See id. at 334, 471 A.2d at 370 (realizing "considerable uncertainty will continue to surround" the Matthews decision).
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As a result of Matthews, and in order to determine when the
public has the right to cross private dry sand in any particular
case, courts will be forced to determine when "reasonable access" exists.1 3 Such a determination should involve consideration of the following factors:
(1) the availability and proximity of publicly owned
property that can
be used as an alternative means of access to
84
the foreshore;'
(2) the availability and proximity of undeveloped parcels
of land adjacent to the shoreline
that can provide a public
8 5
right-of-way to the wet sand;'
(3) the availability and proximity of public streets
that
18 6
can provide a public right-of-way to the wet sand;
(4) the availability and proximity of municipally owned
upland sand areas adjacent to18public
streets that can provide a
7
right-of-way to the wet sand;
(5) the accessibility to the foreshore through neighboring municipalities;
(6)

the length and continuity of oceanfront property

held by private owners;'
(7)

88

the safety of alternative access routes; 189

(8) the nature, safety, and suitability for swimming and
recreation of the beach to which access is sought as compared
to surrounding beach areas;' 90

183

See id. at 324-26, 471 A.2d at 364-66.

184 See id. at 324, 471 A.2d at 365.
185 See id.
186 See id.
187

See id.

The public's ability to gain access to the foreshore may be severely limited by
excessively large blocks of privately owned oceanfront property.
189 Potential access routes that are considerably dangerous, for example high
dunes or rocky bluffs, should not be considered as providing a reasonable means of
188

beach entry.

190 Certain beaches have little or no dry sand suitable for relaxation and recreation. Other beaches may present unhealthy or dangerous swimming conditions.
Access to an unsafe or an unsuitable foreshore should not satisfy the public trust
doctrine.
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(9) the private owner's present use of the property in
question and the expectation of privacy on the part of the
owner; 19 1 and

(10)

the past use of the
property in question and the ex2

19
pectations of the public.

For purposes of simplification, the issues of reasonable access
and reasonable use may be cloaked in terms of convenience.1 9 3 If it
is reasonably convenient for the public to use a route less intrusive
to private interests, then that alternative route should be employed.
In contrast, if alternative means of reaching the foreshore are either
unsafe or sufficiently inconvenient, reasonable access does not exist
and the rights of the individual landowner become subordinate to
the public trust.
Considering the pervasiveness of municipal regulatory schemes
which impact upon beach rights, 1 94 it should be emphasized that the
191 In determining whether the public should have the right to cross a particular
parcel of land, it may be desirable to consider the owner's past and present use of
the property. Since the balancing approach advocated by the Matthews court requires that the public's right be "subject[ed] to an accommodation of the interests
of the owner," Matthews, 95 N.J. at 325, 471 A.2d at 365, it follows that a de minimis
private interest (small expectation of privacy) is more apt to subserve the public's
right under the public trust doctrine.
192 Where a private parcel of land has historically been subjected to public use, it
is likely that the interests of the private owner can be more easily subordinated to
the rights of the public. In this regard, weighing the expectations of the public
operates as a corollary to factor (9). See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
193 In this context, "convenience" should be used in a broad definitional sense to
include safety and economic considerations, i.e., if an alternative route is not safe
or economical, it is not convenient and therefore not reasonable.
194 Municipal authority to regulate and police the beach, boardwalk, and other
recreational facilities is statutorily conferred. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 40:61-22.20 (West
1967). The statute provides:
The governing body of any municipality bordering on the Atlantic
ocean . . . which owns or shall acquire . . . lands bordering on the
ocean . . . for a place of resort for public health and recreation and for
other public purposes shall have the exclusive control, government and
care thereof and of any boardwalk, bathing and recreational facilities,
safeguards and equipment, now or hereafter constructed or provided
thereon, and may, by ordinance, make and enforce rules and regulations
for the government and policing of such lands, boardwalk, bathing facilities, safeguards and equipment; provided, that such power of control,
government, care and policing shall not be construed in any manner to
exclude or interfere with the operation of any State law or authority with
respect to such lands, property and facilities. Any such municipality
may, in order to provide funds to improve, maintain and police the same
and to protect the same from erosion, encroachment and damage by sea
or otherwise, and to provide facilities and safeguards for public bathing
and recreation, including the employment of lifeguards, by ordinance,
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mere physical presence of potentially usable routes to the foreshore
does not satisfy the public trust doctrine. For example, if a municipality enacts a parking ordinance which has the practical effect of
preventing the public from using certain routes to the ocean, those
routes should be treated as though they do not exist for purposes of
determining reasonable access. Inasmuch as municipalities can significantly impair the public's ability to reach the foreshore, reasonable access determinations should also consider the availability,
proximity, and cost of parking and transportation facilities. In addition, because municipalities presently have the discretion to determine beach capacity and beach fees, 19 5 the maximum number of
daily and seasonal beach badges available to the general public, as
well as the cost of admission to the beach, should be considered.
The case by case analysis advocated by the Matthews court beckons future litigation.1 9 6 To stem the tide of protracted lawsuits, a
strong legislative policy must be developed to define expressly the
public's rights within beach areas. Furthermore, any statutory plan
should create an enforcing authority with the power to resolve
make and enforce rules and regulations for the government, use, maintenance and policing thereof and provide for the charging and collecting of reasonable fees for the registration of persons using said lands
and bathing facilities, for access to the beach and bathing and recreational grounds so provided and for the use of the bathing and recreational facilities, but no such fees shall be charged or collected from
children under the age of 12 years.
Id. Similar powers to regulate the beach are conferred upon a borough by id.
§ 40:92-7.1.
The breadth of municipal authority has been somewhat elucidated by several
cases involving challenges to specific regulations. See, e.g., Capano v. Borough of
Stone Harbor, 530 F. Supp. 1254, 1268-71 (D.N.J. 1982) (holding borough must
make swimming facilities available to all on equal basis; borough must use identifiable standards in determining where to establish swimming beaches; and borough
cannot prevent private owners from using private beach lands); Lusardi v. Curtis
Point Property Owners Ass'n, 86 N.J. 217, 430 A.2d 881 (1981) (invalidating municipal zoning ordinance allowing only single family residential use of oceanfront
property, and holding goal of residential zoning must yield to state policy in favor
of providing beach property for public recreation); Hyland v. Borough of Allenhurst, 78 N.J. 190, 196, 393 A.2d 579, 582 (1978) (holding municipality cannot
exclude general public from existing toilet facilities adjacent to beach area); Spiegle
v. Beach Haven, 46 NJ. 479, 218 A.2d 129 (upholding municipal ordinance requiring permit before private beachfront landowners could lawfully erect fence from
high water mark landward), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 831 (1966); Sea Watch, Inc. v.
Manasquan, 186 N.J. Super. 25, 451 A.2d 192 (App. Div. 1982) (upholding municipal ordinance requiring all users of macadam walkway clad in bathing attire to
purchase beach badges).
195 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:61-22.20 (West 1967); supra note 194 (quoting
statute).
196 See supra notes 179-82 and accompanying text.
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beach access problems without involving the judiciary. Absent such
a legislative solution, clarification and reform in this area will have
to await future decisions of the New Jersey Supreme Court.
The basis for a statutory remedy in New Jersey was previously
presented to the Legislature and Governor.' 9 7 In 1977, a study
commission completed a detailed report on the beach access
problem.'9 8 The commission profferred recommendations for
state and Federal action, designed to relieve the problem of increasing demand and decreasing supply. 9 9 Among these suggestions was the enactment of a "comprehensive beach
management law"' 20 0 which, in addition to articulating both the
rights of the public and those of private owners, recommended
that
(1) municipalities be prohibited from selling municipally
owned beach property which
could be used as a public right20 1
of-way to the dry sand;

(2) municipalities be prohibited from "restricting nonresidents access to public beaches indirectly, by adopting local
ordinan'ces concerning on-street parking, beach attire onstreets, disrobing
etc., that have the practical effect of limiting
20 2

public access";

(3) guidelines and fee schedules be established to ensure that beach fees are reasonably related to the municipalities' costs in providing a safe beach and that such fees are not
prohibitory; 20 3 and
(4) an agency be established to "identify where privately-owned property blocks the general public from access
to the beach over excessively long20 4stretches and purchase selected access ways to the beach."-

The time for these recommendations to be given the force of law is
long overdue.
While a national policy on beach access would offer a possible
solution to the problem, the United States Congress has repeatedly
197

See

BEACH ACCESS STUDY,

supra note 4.

198 Id.
199

Id. at 8-10.

200 Id.
201

Id. at 9.

202 Id.
203

Id. at 9-10; cf. A. 451, 201st N.J. Leg., 1st Sess. (1984) (proposed bill requir-

ing beach fees to be approved and reasonably related to operating expenses).
204 BEACH ACCESS STUDY, supra note 4, at 11.
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failed to enact such legislation."0 5 State action presents the most
immediate and practical solution. Other jurisdictions have already
moved in such a direction. Landmark judicial decisions in Oregon
and Texas, the leading states on beach access legislation, were
based upon existing state statutes that clearly reflected legislative
approval of the common law rights of public access to the
2 0 6 In contrast, NewJersey's legislation has been limited to
beaches.
policy statements by administrative
agencies on beach access and
2 7
coastal development.
As public demand for the New Jersey shore becomes overwhelming, the Matthews approach to determining beach access will
inevitably lead to the result that some private landowners will be
forced to open their back yards while others will not. Statutory regulation will prevent such an inequitable situation from occurring. In
addition to quenching the public's thirst for access to the beach,
state legislation will treat all shore communities in a uniform manner and will ensure that no single municipality will be forced to bear
a disproportionate share of the burden of providing access. Nevertheless, until legislative action is taken, the courts will remain the
20 8
sole vehicle for guaranteeing a "shoreline for the public.Charles M. Naselsky
205 See, e.g., H.R. 4932, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) (introduced by Rep. Eckhardt); see also Eckhardt, A Rational NationalPolicy on Public Use of the Beaches, 24 SYRACUSE L. REV. 967 (1973).
206 See State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 254 Or. 584, 585-92, 462 P.2d 671, 672-75
(1969); Seaway Co. v. Attorney Gen., 375 S.W.2d 923, 925-26 (Tex. Civ. App.
1964); see also OR. REV. STAT. §§ 390.010, 390.605-.690 (1981) (statute at issue in
Thornton); TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 61.001-024 (Vernon 1978) (statute at issue in Seaway).
207 See, e.g., N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7:7E, § 8.13 (1982).
208 The quoted phrase is taken from the title of the book by Dennis W. Ducsik.
See D. DUCSIK, supra note 155.

